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Introduction 
When do voters ‘sell their vote’ and how is their decision to do so influenced by the 
institutional context? In this article we examine how improved institutional performance in 
public service delivery affects citizen responsiveness to clientelist appeals. We argue that 
where institutions are inefficient and function badly, citizens have greater incentive to prize 
the short term benefits that clientelist exchanges provide than the long term – yet uncertain – 
goods that are promised by programmatic policies. Poor institutional performance therefore 
makes the prospect of a bag of goodies in the hand today more attractive than the promise of 
distributive public policy tomorrow. But in situations where institutional reforms make the 
delivery of basic goods by the state more reliable, citizens may become less responsive to 
vote-buying.  
In developing our hypotheses we build on two key insights from the literature. First, citizens 
respond to clientelist appeals because they are risk averse, preferring direct, instant clientelist 
benefits over indirect, programmatic policies promising uncertain and distant rewards to voters 
(see, for example Desposato 2007, Kitschelt 2000, Kitschelt and Kselman 2013, Scott 1977, 
Wantchekon 2003). Second, clientelist appeals have diminishing marginal utility: thus poor 
people value a handout more highly than do wealthy people; hence, if one is going to hand out 
material inducements, one will target the poor (Dixit and Londregan 1996, Calvo and Murillo 
2004; Stokes et al 2013).  
Previous research has tended to examine both these factors from the perspective of poverty and 
education. But - as we show – the institutional context can also have a strong bearing on the 
nature of this calculus. If institutions do not function well, and are leaky, then the probability 
of ever receiving the promised benefit of a programmatic policy is extremely low. In this 
situation rational voters will discount the future and the prospect of short term clientelist goods 
will be more attractive. We would therefore expect citizens to be more responsive to vote 
buying in such a setting. However, when institutions function better, voters can see the link 
between policy promises and policy implementation and so will be less likely to sacrifice their 
preferred policy outcome for a short-term pay-off.  
In addition, the diminishing marginal utility of clientelist appeals has tended to be regarded as 
a function of citizen income: as people become wealthier they will value less the fixed price of 
a good that they are offered. Or put another way, the greater the value of the good voters are 
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offered, the less difference there will be between whether rich people and poor people are 
responsive to the inducement.  We show that institutional context can also influence the 
marginal utility of vote buying. When public services function badly people will sell their vote 
for relatively little, but as institutions perform better the cost of vote buying also increases. This 
implies that the greater the value of the good voters are offered, the less difference there will 
be between whether people are prepared to sell their vote in well performing institutional 
settings and badly performing institutional settings. Therefore we expect to see larger 
institutional effects on small inducements than large inducements. 
In order to test these propositions we take advantage of a tightly controlled comparison in 
central India made possible by the division of the state (federal sub-unit) of Madhya Pradesh 
in 2000, leading to the formation of the new state of Chhattisgarh. Given that a natural 
experiment is an extremely difficult (if not impossible) research design to execute for our 
research question, this approach is arguably the next best alternative. By carrying out a cross-
border survey, and studying villages on either side of a newly created state border we are able 
to exert a high degree of control over factors commonly associated with clientelism, such as 
poverty, political competition, socioeconomic structure, ethnic and kinship relations, and 
administrative history. Since bifurcation, however, political leaders in the two states have made 
different decisions about how to work with the local bureaucracy to shape the performance of 
institutions that are critical for the delivery of public services. Their different strategies have 
led to substantial variation in the delivery of social welfare programmes, particularly those 
concerned with basic food provision and employment. Inhabitants living on either side of the 
border are thus exposed to different institutional contexts. Those living on the Chhattisgarh 
side of the border have experienced relatively more efficient, universal, and easy to access 
social welfare programmes compared to people living on the Madhya Pradesh side of the 
border where important social programmes remain (inefficiently) targeted, leaky and subject 
to local political intermediation. Villages and inhabitants on the immediate side of either border 
are similar in practically every other way apart from these institutional settings.  
In taking advantage of this tightly controlled comparison, we join a number of other researchers 
(see, for example Berger 2009, Laitin 1986; Miles 1994; Miguel 2004, Miles and Rochefort 
1991, Posner 2004) who have also exploited the partitioning of ethnic groups by administrative 
boundaries to study how similar social groups respond to different social and political 
environments. We can thus explore how groups with similar socio-economic backgrounds 
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respond to clientelist appeals in different institutional environments, while holding constant the 
most important factors associated with the public responsiveness to clientelism across the 
groups.  
Institutional performance and Clientelism 
India is often regarded as a ‘patronage democracy’ (Chandra 2004). Vast amounts of money 
continue to circulate during Indian elections. In the run-up to elections in the state of Bihar in 
2015, journalists reported that ‘almost 17 crore [$2.5million] in cash’ and ‘1.5 lakh [150,000] 
litres of liquor’ had been seized under the electoral code of conduct in a state where ‘cash and 
liquor are commonly used…to influence voters’ (Pandey 2015). The Wall Street Journal asked 
during India’s 2014 General Elections, ‘The big question for some voters … isn't who will win, 
it is how much candidates will dole out in cash, alcohol and other goodies to bag their support’ 
(Mandhana and Agarwal 2014). These reports reflect a widely-held popular perception that 
vote-buying plays an important role in determining voter behaviour. 
In this article we focus on this material dimension of clientelism, rather than the less tangible 
– although still important - longer term relationships that are also embedded within vote-buying 
exchanges. Following Schaffer (2007, 5) we define ‘vote buying’ as the offer of particularistic 
material goods (such as cash, food, clothes, household items) to individuals or households at 
election time in an attempt to influence election outcomes. Despite the prevalence of clientelist 
exchanges of this type in many democracies around the world, we still know comparatively 
little about why parties pursue this type of strategy and why voters respond to them. The 
literature identifies several possible determinants of clientelism. These include economic 
development and public responsiveness to clientelist appeals (Wantchekon 2003, Brusco et al 
2004, Weitz-Shapiro 2012), state institutions and politicians’ access to public resources 
(Hicken 2011), and political competition and politicians’ incentives to make clientelist appeals 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Other explanations include the role of cultural norms such as 
reciprocity (Auyero 2000, Lemarchand 1977, Putnam 1993), ethnicity (Chandra 2004; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), and political institutions such as regime type, campaign finance 
regulations, electoral systems, and ballot design (Golden 2003, van de Walle 2003, Roniger 
2004, Lehoucq and Molina 2002, Brusco et al. 2004, Hicken 2007).  
Although scholars have proposed a wide variety of different factors for the prevalence of 
clientelism, the causal mechanisms at work have been contested and empirical evidence has 
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been mixed. While some controversies have been resolved, others remain. For example, 
whereas there is now widespread agreement in the literature that economic (under) 
development is an important reason for clientelism, the relationship between institutional 
performance and clientelism is still a source of lively debate. Although it is clear that 
institutional legacies are important, it is far less clear how they are important and in what ways.  
The performance and autonomy of bureaucratic institutions may influence elite incentives to 
pursue clientelist exchanges. Shefter (1977; 1993) argues that in administrative systems where 
a high degree of bureaucratic autonomy precedes democratisation, the ability of politicians to 
divert state resources towards clientelist strategies are greatly reduced. Furthermore, he 
suggests, that if political parties are incumbents and therefore have access to state resources 
they are more likely to rely on clientelism than ‘outsider’ or challenger parties who are not in 
positions of power in the existing regime and are therefore forced to rely on programmatic or 
ideological appeals to fight their way to power (see also van de Walle 2003 on the importance 
for parties of winning “founding” elections). Along similar lines Huber and McCarty (2004) 
argue that where bureaucratic capacity is lower, politicians will find it harder to achieve their 
policy goals and will have greater incentives to politicise the bureaucracy, increasing the 
prevalence of clientelism.  
However Keefer (2006) posits the alternative view that once parties win power there may be 
little to prevent them politicizing the bureaucracy to turn it into a source of patronage. Political 
interference with once autonomous bureaucracies is not uncommon (Hicken 2001, Baxter et 
al. 2002, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) thus argue that whether or 
not politicians pursue clientelist strategies depends instead upon their strategies for building 
political credibility rather than the prior quality of institutions. They argue that it is costly for 
politicians to build a reputation for political credibility via public policy commitments: 
‘Politicians must expend resources to reach voters with their promises, to allow voters to 
monitor the fulfilment of promises, and to ensure that voters turn out on election day’ (ibid 
372). Politicians can opt out of these expenditures by relying on intermediaries (or brokers) 
who already have a ‘customary trust relationship’ with some groups of voters.  
Empirical studies have shown that there is substantial variation in the extent to which political 
leaders across India rely primarily on clientelist strategies to mobilise votes. Many leaders 
recognise the need to supplement traditional clientelist strategies with programmatic activities 
or ‘post-clientelist’ strategies that are not implemented in a particularistic or discretionary 
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manner (Wilkinson 2007; Manor 2010; Wyatt 2013). With a growing private sector and larger 
middle class, the electorate may be less dependent on the state, while the growth of the mass 
media has also increased scrutiny of corruption (Wilkinson 2007).   
In this article we build on these insights by examining the issues from a slightly different 
perspective. Rather than examining how the performance of bureaucratic institutions 
influences elite incentives to pursue clientelist exchanges, or how elites politicize the 
bureaucracy to turn it into a source of patronage, we examine how the performance of 
bureaucratic institutions affects citizens’ responsiveness to clientelist appeals and how elites 
can reform the bureaucracy to make it more effective and less corrupt. We do so with reference 
to the delivery of public services, and the delivery of the Public Distribution System 
specifically.  
Research Design  
Clientelist practices may emerge in contexts of weak institutional capacity and may also 
undermine institutional capacity. That is, clientelism may be both a cause and a consequence 
of institutional performance. Indeed a large body of research shows that clientelism is at best 
inefficient and at worst corrupt, with clientelist systems exhibiting lower primary school 
enrolment rates; less effective use of public resources; and more corrupt business practices than 
programmatic systems (Keefer 2006, 2007; Hicken & Simmons 2008; Singer 2009). Moreover, 
both the prevalence of clientelism and the performance of institutions may be co-determined 
by historical legacies relating to the development of the bureaucracy. This means that it is very 
difficult to examine the relationship between institutional capacity and clientelism, and 
attempts to do so (e.g. Bustikova and Coruneanu-Huci 2011) have been criticised for failing to 
take into account reciprocal causation (see Hicken 2011). 
We address this problem by carrying out a carefully constructed comparison which exploits 
the division of Madhya Pradesh into two states.  Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh share many 
economic, developmental, political and cultural similarities and until 2000 were part of the 
same state. They are predominantly rural and Hindi speaking, with large populations of 
‘Scheduled Tribes’ or indigenous communities. They have a common political history of 
Congress Party dominance, challenged in recent decades by the ascendancy of the Hindu 
nationalist BJP which has consistently won all state legislative assembly elections in both states 
since 2003. Both have two-party systems and unlike other Indian states have not seen the 
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emergence of strong regional parties. Both states are characterised by high levels of poverty 
and under-nutrition. Five years after their bifurcation, in both states almost 50% of the 
population was classified as living below the poverty line compared to 37% at the all-India 
level (Planning Commission 2012). Our empirical strategy takes advantage of the fact that 
villages on the Madhya Pradesh side of the border are very similar to villages on the 
Chhattisgarh side of the border —save for the administrative zone under which they fall.  
India’s constitution gives the federal government the ability to divide or change the boundaries 
of states within the federation on the basis of a simple parliamentary majority. Unlike most 
other instances in which new states have been created in India, the bifurcation of Madhya 
Pradesh did not respond to strong popular mobilisation demanding statehood. The division of 
Madhya Pradesh arose from inter-elite contestation, rather than pressure from below (Tillin 
2013). This is in contrast to the other two states which were created elsewhere in India at the 
same time, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand, where there had been long-run social mobilisation for 
greater regional autonomy in the form of statehood and where patterns of political competition 
have diverged from their parent states since their bifurcation.  
While the creation of the new state of Chhattisgarh was more top-down than other instances of 
state creation, the redrawing of state boundaries was not entirely random since the new state 
borders follow the line of earlier district boundaries. In the area covered by Marwahi assembly 
constituency (see Figure 1), the state border followed the contour of the district boundary in 
the old colonial-era Central Provinces and Berar province, and to the north the border followed 
district boundaries that encompassed areas governed by earlier princely states. The process of 
bifurcation was striking in that there was little contestation about which districts should be 
included in Chhattisgarh. The region of Madhya Pradesh that became present-day Chhattisgarh 
was regarded as a backwater of the parent state. It was poor and under-developed, despite the 
presence of natural resources. Unlike the cases of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand (and the more 
recent case of Telangana), there was no backlash from the parent state against the proposed 
bifurcation and little sustained dispute as to where the new state border should fall. In fact, the 
first resolution in favour of creating the state was passed without any major opposition by the 
Madhya Pradesh state assembly in 1994 (Tillin 2013, 153).  
The districts sampled in our study, which all have substantial tribal populations, were mostly 
indirectly ruled by various princely states during the colonial era, and thus bear many 
similarities to each other in terms of their longer term histories of administration. Moreover, 
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the borders were not drawn to enhance the political advantage of incumbent elites on either 
side, and the districts on either side of the border remain nearly identical in terms of party 
competition and electoral outcomes. Thus the division of the two states was – unlike many 
other instances of state creation in India – a largely top-down administrative reform that did 
not reflect popular mobilisation or different patterns of electoral politics on the ground. 
Populations living immediately adjacent to the state border were divided by a new 
administrative boundary that they had not played a role in demanding or constructing.  
Table 1 here 
As Table 1 shows, at the point of bifurcation, the villages on either side of the state border were 
very similar to each other in social and political terms, and in institutional terms with respect 
to the provision of public services. While the proportion of Scheduled Tribes was higher in the 
Shahdol district of Madhya Pradesh in 2001 than in the Chhattisgarh districts, the proportion 
of Scheduled Castes was higher on the Chhattisgarh side.1 Over 40% of the population in the 
districts on either side of the border come from these socioeconomically disadvantaged groups. 
Politically, the assembly segments on either side of the border were both characterised by 
competitive contests between the BJP and Congress, with similar levels of voter turnout 
suggesting little difference in civic participation. And institutionally, the proportion of villages 
with access to education and health services, water and electricity, and transportation links was 
very similar on either side of the border, reflecting the common administrative history the two 
new states shared.  
However, despite their common administrative histories and shared developmental challenges, 
since bifurcation the political leadership of the two states have pursued markedly different 
approaches to public administration, particularly with regard to the delivery of welfare 
programmes. In Chhattisgarh, the state’s top political leadership made the strategic decision to 
improve the efficiency of social transfer programmes, in particular the Public Distribution 
System (PDS) through which subsidised food is distributed, and the Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) through which rural households can 
demand up to 100 days employment per year on public works. By contrast in Madhya Pradesh, 
                                                          
1 Census of India 2001. Because the assembly constituencies surveyed cross more than one sub-district, it is not 
possible to provide census data at the level of the assembly constituency. The data here thus refers to districts 
that are larger than the assembly constituencies surveyed. In the villages we surveyed within assembly 
constituencies, as shown below (table 2), the Scheduled Tribe population was in fact larger on the Chhattisgarh 
side of the border. 
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no such strategic decisions were made by the political leadership. Food subsidies, in particular, 
continued to function as a major system of patronage dispersal. 
Throughout India, the Public Distribution System has been known for high levels of corruption. 
A Planning Commission survey in 2004 estimated that 58% of foodgrains do not reach their 
intended beneficiaries (Saxena 2012). Common complaints about the operation of the PDS 
relate to the sale of foodgrains on the black market, the adulteration of the foodgrains sold 
through ‘fair price shops’, unaccountable local shopkeepers who do not open at regular hours 
and frequently claim not to have received supplies, and local bureaucratic corruption or 
inefficiency which frequently excludes the poorest from possession of the requisite ‘ration 
card’ (see summary in Pritchard et al. 2014, 110–1). For these reasons the PDS has been the 
subject of vigorous national debate, and reform efforts. India’s Supreme Court issued a series 
of legal orders from 2001 onwards seeking enforcement of the ‘right to food’. These orders 
placed a legal requirement on all states to improve the performance of the Public Distribution 
System. More recently, after a lengthy political debate, a new National Food Security Act was 
passed in late 2013 providing statutory backing to a ‘right to food’, and stipulating new 
requirements for food subsidies and their delivery. Yet states have demonstrated substantial 
variation in how they have approached edicts to improve the efficiency of the Public 
Distribution System.2 
Since 2003, the state government in Chhattisgarh has embarked on the most far-reaching 
reforms to the PDS of any state in India. At the heart of these reforms was an overhaul of the 
delivery of subsidised food through a combination of reforms to delivery mechanisms, 
computerisation, and an expansion of the beneficiary pool to transform a programme that had 
been targeted towards the ‘below poverty line’ (BPL) population into a quasi-universal 
programme. It brought ‘fair price shops’ and the transportation companies which move 
foodgrains between field, rice mill, warehouse and shop, back into public ownership. These 
decisions triggered over 400 court cases, and required the state’s top political leadership to 
withstand pressure from private traders, an important constituency for the incumbent BJP. 
Licences to run fair price shops were then granted to local elected councils, self-help groups 
and cooperative societies in an attempt to improve their accountability to local communities. 
Subsequently, the Chief Minister, Raman Singh, decided to substantially expand the proportion 
of the population with access to heavily subsidised food by launching a new ‘Chief Minister’s 
                                                          
2 Fieldwork for this study was conducted before the National Food Security Act came into effect in the states. 
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Food Security Scheme’ which granted 35kg of rice at just 2 rupees per kilogramme to poor 
families, and at 1 rupee per kilogramme to the poorest. Simultaneously, senior civil servants 
were empowered to undertake efficiency reforms through computerisation and enhanced 
transparency mechanisms, including the use of GPS tracking of trucks moving foodgrains, 
sending SMS messages to local villagers to inform them of the date new foodgrains would be 
delivered to their local shop, and using a centralised computerised database to reissue ‘ration 
cards’.3  
The reforms have had a dramatic impact on preventing leakages of foodgrains and ensuring 
foodgrains reach the final mile to the fair price shop, as well as ensuring that access to ration 
cards is not dependent on the discretion of local officials (see also Patnaik 2010; Puri 2012). 
By increasing transparency and reducing corruption, they have changed the way that these 
welfare programmes are delivered in Chhattisgarh and – as our survey results demonstrate – 
have had a pronounced impact on the delivery of, and satisfaction with, the operation of the 
Public Distribution System specifically. Chhattisgarh is also considered to be one of the more 
effective states at implementing the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme, the largest social protection programme introduced in India in the last decade (Dreze 
and Khera 2014). 
By contrast, in Madhya Pradesh, access to the same schemes is much more unreliable and 
bureaucratic corruption continues to play a critical role in determining access. The Public 
Distribution System in particular is notoriously ‘leaky’, foodgrains are siphoned off at various 
stages of the system and the poor have extremely unreliable access, compounded by the fact 
they frequently do not possess the requisite ration card to secure their entitlements in the first 
place. While the state government also attempted to initiate reforms to the Public Distribution 
System, the reform process was more confused and did not receive clear direction from the 
political leadership. Reforms in Madhya Pradesh focused more on the question of dealing with 
‘inclusion’ errors – with people who should not have Below Poverty Line ration cards but do 
– rather than with ‘exclusion errors’. The thrust was largely technocratic with a private 
consortium hired, on the basis of a contract that was veiled in secrecy, to create a biometric 
ration card database which was intended to be linked to a system of food coupons in the future. 
At the time of our survey in late 2013, there had been very little attempt to improve 
                                                          
3 The reforms process is analysed in greater depth in Tillin, Saxena and Sisodia (2015) drawing on interviews 
with politicians, officials, NGO staff and other local informants in both states. 
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transparency or accountability, and the leadership necessary to overcome local political and 
bureaucratic resistance to reform was not evident. Bureaucratic malpractice was widespread. 
Local villagers frequently had to pay bribes to get a ration card, foodgrains were often mixed 
with impurities and the poorest were often denied the correct level of entitlement– as the survey 
evidence we present below demonstrates. This means that the PDS remained a vehicle for 
patronage, captured by vested interests, rather than for the effective delivery of foodgrains to 
the food insecure.  
It is worth emphasising here that the differences between the two states are of degree and not 
absolute. Patron-client relations continue to exist in Chhattisgarh but have been supplemented 
by more successful instances of programmatic policy delivery. Equally, Madhya Pradesh is far 
from the most feckless of state governments (Jenkins and Manor 2015). But there are stark 
differences in outcomes in terms of the performance of key areas of social policy to do with 
food and employment. According to data collected as part of the ‘PEEP survey’ by Drèze and 
Khera (2014), access to the PDS scheme among eligible recipients is much higher in 
Chhattisgarh than it is in Madhya Pradesh (99% vs 49%) and the average number of days 
worked per household registered on the MGNREGS is much higher in Chhattisgarh than in 
Madhya Pradesh (34 vs 8).   
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to fully explain why the two states have pursued 
such different strategies, one reason may be to do with electoral strategy and the ways in which 
the respective BJP leaders have sought to achieve what Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) term 
‘political credibility’, particularly among the rural poor. The Chief Minister of Madhya 
Pradesh, Shivraj Singh Chauhan, comes from an agriculturalist caste, and as such has a more 
natural affinity with middling agricultural groups (the strata above the poorest rural dwellers 
who own and cultivate some land). In order to strengthen this affinity his politics have focused 
more on his rustic appeal that emphasises his ‘sons of the soil’ origins. Consistent with this he 
has developed pro-agriculturalist policies in the state. He has not focussed as squarely on 
improving the efficiency of the welfare programmes initiated by the central government in the 
state, and the PDS in particular has been subject to substantial leakages and failure to reach its 
intended beneficiaries among the rural poor (often agricultural labourers), who frequently lack 
even the identification they need to access their entitlements. On the other hand, the Chief 
Minister of Chhattisgarh, Raman Singh has pursued a different electoral strategy. Unlike 
Chauhan, Raman Singh hails from an upper caste. In order to establish credibility he has sought 
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to reach out to the rural poor projecting himself in a more paternalistic light. He made the 
strategic decision to invest in improving the efficiency of, and expanding access to, the PDS to 
ensure that subsidised rice reaches the poor. His politics have focussed on establishing his 
credibility as a ‘provider’ and he projects himself as the ‘chawal wale baba’ (rice man).  While 
any explanation for why the political leaders adopted such different strategies must be treated 
as somewhat speculative, the crucial point is that under these leaders the two states diverged in 
terms of their institutional performance which had a clear impact on service delivery. 
Thus, despite sharing a common culture, history and level of economic development, the 
contemporary approach to service delivery is strikingly different between the two states. The 
differences in political and administrative strategies across the two neighbouring states, which 
until their bifurcation were part of the same administrative structure, provide an almost unique 
set of conditions to examine the impact of different institutional contexts on voter 
responsiveness to clientelism. Importantly we can be confident that the variation in the delivery 
of public services across the states is not endogenous to local electoral or socioeconomic factors 
but rather is a consequence of the different reform strategies adopted by political leaders. In 
other words, it is not an underlying shift in voter responsiveness to clientelism that has pushed 
one state in a more programmatic direction in some areas of government activity, but rather a 
strategic decision by the political leadership in Chhattisgarh to make the public delivery of 
welfare programmes work more successfully.  
Data description 
In order to examine the impact of these different institutional contexts on citizen 
responsiveness to clientelist appeals we administered a survey in 40 villages on either side of 
the new state border: 20 in Madhya Pradesh (in the assembly constituencies of Anuppur and 
Kotma) and 20 in Chhattisgarh (in the assembly constituencies of Marwahi and 
Manendragarh). Their location is shown in Figure 1. We purposively selected the two state 
legislative assembly constituencies on either side of the border matching the incumbency 
status of each, so that we had both a BJP and Congress held constituency in each state. 
Within each constituency we randomly selected 10 villages and in each village we randomly 
selected 12 people from the electoral rolls. The surveys were completed during the election 
season of November-December 2013 during which new state legislative assemblies were 
elected simultaneously in both states. The surveys were conducted after voting had taken 
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place but before the results were announced so that participants would be thinking about the 
conduct of the recent elections but not influenced by their outcomes.  
Figure 1 about here 
Table 2 presents a balance check on factors that are theoretically thought to be related to vote 
buying. By far and away the two most important factors that have been identified in the 
literature are wealth and education. Poor people and poorly educated people are thought to be 
more willing to sell their vote. As the table shows, our two groups are well balanced, and 
selected inhabitants on either side of the border are statistically indistinguishable on these 
covariates. Moreover, what differences there are work against our key hypothesis as 
respondents on the Madhya Pradesh side of the border are slightly better educated and slightly 
better off. Other possible confounds are cultural norms (Auyero 2000) and ethnicity (Chandra 
2004). Culturally the two groups are very similar: the villages on either side of the border are 
in deep forested areas. Inhabitants are predominantly Hindus with large Scheduled Tribe 
populations. Despite these similarities we should note that there are more Scheduled Tribes, 
specifically from the Gond community, on the Chhattisgarh side of the border. However, if 
anything, we might expect Scheduled Tribes to be more likely to respond to clientelist appeals 
as they are one of the most economically deprived ethnic groups in India, so this lack of balance 
works against our key hypothesis. 
Lastly, institutional factors such as regime type, electoral systems, or ballot design (Golden 
2003) and political competition (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007) are often thought to be related 
to clientelism. Institutional factors are obviously the same for both groups since all Indian states 
follow the same electoral systems. In addition the structure of political competition is also the 
same: the BJP are the incumbent state government in both states; the principal party 
competition is between the Congress and BJP in each of the selected constituencies; and there 
was an incumbent MLA (Member of the Legislative Assembly) from both the Congress and 
BJP on each side of the border. 
Table 2 about here 
Given that a natural experiment is an extremely difficult (if not impossible) research design to 
execute for our research question, our data on the history of state formation, public service 
reform and balance tests on theoretically relevant covariates give us confidence that our two 
sample groups do provide valid counterfactual groups. That said, in order to improve our 
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causal inferences we first employ regression analysis to control for any differences that do 
exist between our two groups; and second, we turn to semiparametric matching methods to 
balance covariates to mitigate against possible confounders (Ho et al. 2007).  
Institutional performance 
To gather data on the institutional context we asked a range of questions designed to measure 
how people access and evaluate a range of different public services on the ground.  As already 
mentioned, the areas of public service delivery that have undergone the most extensive process 
of reform in Chhattisgarh are concerned with food and employment. If these institutional 
reforms have been implemented effectively on the ground, then we should anticipate that 
evaluations of these public services will markedly differ between the two states. By contrast, 
those services which have not been reformed – and so share the same institutional legacy – 
should function  - and be evaluated - in a similar way.  
From Table 3 we can see that by far and away the biggest differences between the states are on 
evaluations of food (PDS) and employment (MGNREGS). In both cases the services are 
evaluated far more positively in Chhattisgarh than they are in Madhya Pradesh. This indicates 
that the reform process has shaped the ways in which people experience and evaluate the 
services on the ground. By contrast, those services which have not been subject to major reform 
are evaluated in a very similar way across the two states. There are not any significant 
differences between our two groups on evaluations of health, education, electricity, water or 
law and order. The only exception is for roads, where evaluations do differ significantly 
between the two states, although the magnitude of the difference (0.23 points) is substantially 
less than the mean difference for evaluations of the PDS, which is nearly three times greater at 
0.63 points.   
Table 3 about here 
To get a deeper understanding about why these performance evaluations differ between the 
two groups we asked a series of follow up questions specifically about the PDS and MGNREG 
schemes (Table 4). The first thing to notice is that despite similar levels of poverty between the 
two groups, access to ration cards – and crucially access to the BPL ration cards  - is much 
lower on the MP side of the border. Whereas 79% of inhabitants on the Chhattisgarh side had 
a BPL card just 34% on the MP side did so. Moreover, those people who did possess a BPL 
card in MP were not disproportionately found among the most needy, and in fact possession of 
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a BPL card was somewhat higher among the better off than it was among the extreme poor. In 
follow up interviews we asked inhabitants why they did not have a ration card (if they did not 
have one) and we were frequently told that it was because they had not paid a bribe to the local 
bureaucrat. One popular refrain we heard in the villages in MP was that “here the rich people 
have ration cards but the poor people don’t.” Corruption in the local bureaucracy was seen to 
be rife and a major obstacle to the successful implementation of policies. Others told us that 
although the Chief Minister in MP had lots of good initiatives, these policies never worked 
well on the ground. This is borne out by our survey evidence which shows that access to the 
PDS is much higher on the Chhattisgarh side of the border than on MP side, as is satisfaction 
with how well the scheme works. 
Table 4 about here  
These results are reassuring for the validity of our comparison. We can be confident that the 
different institutional environments are a consequence of specific reforms to service delivery 
that were carried out by the political leadership in Chhattisgarh on the PDS (and to a lesser 
extent MGNREGS), rather than more general differences between administrative zones and 
local bureaucracies which may be related to historical legacies from before the bifurcation of 
the state.  
Institutional performance and responsiveness to clientelism 
Having established the broad equivalence of our two groups on all theoretically important 
confounds, and described the process of top-down reform which has led to very different 
institutional environments, we now turn to examining the impact of the institutional context 
on voters’ willingness to vote in return for particularistic material goods. To this end we 
asked respondents in our survey about a number of hypothetical vote-buying situations. We 
carried out a split sample survey experiment where the party was randomized so that half of 
the sample was asked about a BJP party worker and half the sample was asked about a 
Congress party worker. We piloted various different versions of the questionnaire to see how 
respondents reacted to different phrasings of the question. Given that clientelism is such a 
pervasive feature of Indian politics, and that vote buying was discussed quite openly by 
inhabitants of the villages we decided to ask a simple and direct question that was easily 
understood. We asked four variations of the question, in which the value of the hypothetical 
inducement varied from very small (vegetables) to very large (a government job).  
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Now, I’d like you to imagine that during the recent election campaign, a party worker 
from the Congress/BJP gave you money that would allow you to buy vegetables for 
your family for a week.  Would you vote for their party?  
And what if someone from Congress/BJP helped to pay the expenses for medical 
treatment for someone in your family? Would you vote for their party?  
 
And what if someone from Congress/BJP helped get your house a new water pump? 
Would you vote for their party? 
 
And what if someone from Congress/BJP helped to get a member of your family a 
government job after the election? Would you vote for their party? 
 
The first thing to note is that respondents had a clear ordering of the value of the 
inducements. People were most responsive to large inducements and least responsive to small 
inducements. As we would expect, the provision of a job was the most powerful inducement 
to vote for a party, with nearly 60% of respondents reporting that they would vote for the 
party providing the material favour. The provision of a water pump was valued slightly more 
highly (26%) than medicine (18%). The provision of vegetables was valued somewhat less, 
but even in return for a relatively minor inducement around one in ten people still said that 
they would vote for the party who provided the material favour. These findings show that 
people living in the context of rural poverty, unemployment, and low rates of literacy are 
highly responsive to clientelist appeals. 
In order to test the impact of the institutional context on voters’ responsiveness to material 
inducements we run a series of logistic regression models that also control for individual level 
attributes. In particular, it is well known that poor and uneducated voters are most receptive to 
clientelist appeals, but does the institutional context also matter when we take into account 
these individual level attributes?  
Table 5 shows the parameter estimates for the most theoretically important covariates of vote 
selling. In each model the dependent variable is whether someone would vote for a party in 
return for the named inducement on offer (1=Yes; 0=No). The independent variables are 
institutional context (where 1 = Chhattisgarh side of the border; 0 = MP side of the border); 
poverty (where 1 = above poverty line; 0 = below poverty line, and poverty line is set at a 
family living on less than £1 per day); education (where 1 = above primary education; 0 = 
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primary or below); caste (which captures the main ethnic groups living in the locality and 
distinguishes between Upper Castes, OBC (Other Backward Classes), SC (Scheduled Castes 
or former untouchables), ST (Scheduled Tribes or ‘indigenous’ population) and others); and 
co-partisanship. Our split sample survey experiment randomized the party offering the 
inducement. In a separate question we asked respondents about their own party affiliation. The 
variable for co-partisanship links these two questions together (where 1 = party offering the 
inducement matches the voter’s party affiliation and 0 = it does not match).  
Table 5 about here 
In line with prior theory we can see that poverty and education influence whether or not 
people respond to clientelist appeals. Across all models the variables are correctly signed. 
People living above the poverty line and people with some education above primary are less 
responsive to clientelist appeals (particularly in the case when the size of the inducement is 
very small). In line with prior theory we also observe evidence consistent with the 
diminishing marginal utility of such inducements. The magnitude of the coefficients for 
poverty and education are smaller for large inducements (and do not achieve significance) 
than they are for small inducements (which are significant), indicating that the greater the 
value of the good voters are offered, the less difference there is between whether richer 
people and poorer people are responsive to the inducement.  We can also see that there are 
some ethnic differences – and Scheduled Tribes – one of the most deprived groups in India – 
are more responsive to clientelist appeals than the other castes. This finding is consistent 
across the models.  
Interestingly, we also see strong effects with respect to partisanship. Across each of the 
models voters are more responsive to inducements that come from co-partisans, though once 
again the magnitude of the coefficient is greater for small inducements than it is for larger 
inducements. When the effect of co-partisanship is large then the inducement to vote has a 
stronger effect on co-partisans than it does on non-supporters, meaning that the inducement 
has a relatively stronger impact on mobilisation than conversion. By contrast, when the effect 
of co-partisanship is small then the inducement is able to both mobilise and convert equally. 
This implies that small inducements are more effective at mobilisation than conversion, and 
that parties may get more bang for their buck by targeting supporters with small inducements 
and ‘buying turnout’ (Nichter 2008) rather than offering these inducements to swing voters or 
partisans of other parties.  
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However, even controlling for all these factors there are significant differences between the 
two institutional groups in terms of how responsive people are to the different types of 
inducement. In the context of poor institutional performance on the MP side of the border 
respondents are significantly more responsive to small inducements than they are in the well 
performing institutional context on the Chhattisgarh side. However, as the size of the 
inducement increases the difference between the two groups decreases to non-significant 
levels. When the inducement is a water pump or medicine we do not see any significant 
institutional effects. Both of these goods are quite highly valued goods. Most of the villages on 
both sides of the border only had a limited water supply, and during fieldwork people 
frequently raised healthcare and medical expenses as a major source of anxiety (see also 
Krishna 2011). Consistent with our theory then we observe relatively larger institutional effects 
on small inducements than on medium and large inducements, which suggests that the 
institutional context can influence the marginal utility of vote buying.  
We can get a clearer idea of the magnitude of these effects by calculating the predicted 
probabilities for whether a person from the Scheduled Tribe community, living below the 
poverty line with no educational qualifications would vote for a party in return for the named 
inducement on offer, according to which side of the border they live. For this group of voters 
the predicted probability of responding to the food inducement is 0.26 in the context of poor 
institutional performance on the MP side of the border but just 0.09 in the well performing 
institutional context on the Chhattisgarh side. This represents a sizeable difference. 
Moreover, the average effect of institutional context (when holding all other variables at their 
mean) is about 9 percentage points. 
Table 6 about here  
 
Propensity score matching 
In order to strengthen our inferences, we pre-process the data with a “matching” procedure 
(e.g. Dunning 2008; Ho et al. 2007). Under this procedure, the effect of being exposed to 
different institutional contexts is more accurately measured by comparing the attitudes and 
behaviours of survey respondents who are similar to one another, save the fact that one was 
exposed to a better performing public services and the other was not. In other words, the idea 
is that the researcher imposes some degree of “experimental” control on what is observational 
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data (Klofstad et al 2012). By comparing the attitudes and behaviours of similar individuals 
who were and were not exposed to a well-performing public services, we can be more 
confident that any observed differences in attitudes and behaviours between these groups are 
unrelated to the factors that the respondents were matched on (and as such, are a consequence 
of being exposed to a well-performing public services instead of some confounding factor).  
In seminal work, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed propensity score matching as a 
method to reduce the bias in the estimation of ‘treatment’ effects with observational data sets. 
Matching methods differ in the way matched cases between the study groups are defined (Ho 
et al. 2007). Inverse probability weighting with regression adjustment (IPWRA) estimators 
model both the outcome and the selection, which means that the estimate of the institutional 
effect will be unbiased if either the selection model or the outcome model are misspecified. It 
is important to note that matching is less precise than a controlled experiment because the 
procedure does not account for unobserved differences between individuals who were and 
were not exposed to different institutional contexts (Sekhon 2009). However, since 
unobserved differences between individuals who were and were not exposed to different 
institutional contexts are likely to correlate with observed differences, they are accounted for 
by proxy in the matching procedure (Stuart and Green 2008). To this end an extensive set of 
covariates were used in the matching procedure, increasing the likelihood that any 
meaningful covariates of responsiveness to clientelism are accounted for in the analysis. Each 
of the covariates reported in Table 5 were included in the matching procedure. Importantly 
we also included whether respondents had access to the PDS scheme (reported in Table 4) 
since we wanted to get an estimate of the institutional context, regardless of whether 
households across the two units had access to food benefits.  
Table 7 about here  
To summarize the causal effect of institutional context we can estimate the average treatment 
effect (ATE). Table 7 shows the ATE of institutional context on each of the inducements. 
Once again we can see that the main findings hold up. The effect of being exposed to the 
better performing institutional context of Chhattisgarh significantly reduces voter’s 
responsiveness to low value inducements.  The ATE is just under 6 percentage points. This is 
somewhat lower than the naïve estimate from the logistic regression models, of about 9 
percentage points. However, once again, we do not find evidence that the institutional context 
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influences voter’s responsiveness to higher value inducements which may be standing in for 
public goods and services that are in scarcer supply in both states.  
Conclusion 
When do voters ‘sell their vote’? Answers to this simple question have long puzzled scholars 
of comparative politics. Although a wide range of individual level factors to do with income 
and education have been proposed – up until now there has been relatively little attention on 
how the calculus of voters is influenced by the institutional context and the delivery of public 
services. Part of the reason for this is that the vast majority of studies on clientelism have 
been based on single country case studies. Comparative studies have been few and those 
which do exist have tended to focus on the behaviour of clientelist parties rather than the 
responsiveness of voters.  
In this study we have attempted to overcome these difficulties by drawing on a carefully 
constructed comparison made possible by the division of Madhya Pradesh into two separate 
states which have pursued very different processes of public service reform. This allows us to 
examine two very different institutional contexts which share many social, economic and 
political characteristics. To our knowledge this is the first study that has managed to examine 
how both individual level factors and institutional factors jointly shape whether or not people 
respond to clientelist appeals.  
At the individual level our results are supportive of current theories of vote buying which 
emphasise the importance of poverty and education. In addition we show that mobilization 
effects are greater than conversion effects, and that small inducements have a greater impact 
on mobilization that conversion. However we also show that above and beyond these individual 
level factors the institutional context matters. We show that institutional context can influence 
the marginal utility of vote buying. When public services function badly people are prepared 
to sell their vote for relatively little, but as services perform better the cost of vote buying also 
increases. Or put another way, the greater the value of the good voters are offered, the less 
difference we observe between whether people are prepared to sell their vote in well performing 
institutional settings and badly performing institutional settings. This suggests a threshold 
effect. When institutions don’t function well even small inducements can have a sizeable effect 
on vote choice. However, in better performing institutional contexts where basic services are 
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better provided, such minor inducements are less likely to be successful at buying votes. Thus 
as institutions perform better the cost of vote buying also increases. 
The central implications of these findings are that citizens respond to clientelist appeals 
because they are risk averse, relying on short causal chains that prize direct, instant clientelist 
benefits over indirect, programmatic linkages promising uncertain and distant rewards to 
voters. Although it is well known that poverty and education matter in this regard, our 
findings show that institutional context also matters. If institutions do not function well, and 
are leaky, then the probability of ever receiving the promised benefit of a programmatic 
policy is extremely low. In this situation rational voters will discount the future and the 
appeal of short term clientelist goods will be more attractive. However, when institutions 
function well, even in a limited way, voters can see the link between policy promises and 
policy implementation and so will be less likely to sacrifice their preferred policy outcome 
for a short-term pay-off. Poor institutional performance therefore makes the prospect of direct 
personal transfers today more attractive than the promise of redistributive public policy 
tomorrow.  
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Figure 1 Research site 
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Table 1 Pre-Bifurcation Balance Checks 
 Chhattisgarh Madhya Pradesh 
Demographics   
  Literacy 52 49 
  Sex ratioa 959 956  
  In work 44 43 
  Scheduled Tribes 25 44 
  Scheduled Castes 16 7 
Service Delivery   
  Safe drinking water 98 100 
  Electricity for domestic purposes 56 52 
  Primary school 89 94 
  Secondary school 13 12 
  Primary health centre 15 10 
  Bus services 14 21 
  Paved approach road 34 33 
Politics   
  Turnout 54% 49% 
  BJP 43% 44% 
  Congress 41% 36% 
  JD 5% 1% 
  BSP 4% 6% 
Note: a Women per 1000 men. Demographic and Service Delivery data comes from district area profiles, Census 
of India 2001. The districts are Shahdol in Madhya Pradesh, and Bilaspur and Koriya in Chhattisgarh. Political 
data comes from 1998 Vidhan Sabha elections, Election Commission of India.  
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Table 2. Balance tests on covariates 
 Chhattisgarh  MP  T test (Diff of 
means 
P value 
Median HH Income per 
month  
Rs 3000  Rs 3000    
Mean HH Income per 
month 
Rs9141 Rs11551 1.55 0.121 
Literacy rate 62  68  1.566 0.118 
Female  49  48  0.136 0.892 
Mean age  37  40  2.586 0.010 
Hindu 86 94 2.90 0.003 
ST  48  22  6.21 <0.0005 
Gond 37 16 5.33 <0.0005 
Village  43  43  0.132 0.895 
N 239 240   
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Table 3  Evaluations of public services 
 Chhattisgarh  MP  Difference of 
means (T test) 
P value 
Roads 1.54 1.77 3.00 0.002 
Health 1.81 1.72 1.22 0.223 
Electricity 1.54 1.50 0.04 0.621 
Water 1.99 1.92 0.86 0.389 
Law and Order 1.79 1.77 0.31 0.755 
Education 1.39 1.52 1.91 0.056 
Food (PDS) 1.14 1.77 9.49 <0.0005 
Employment 
(MGNREGS) 
1.76 2.15 4.87 <0.0005 
N 231 214   
Notes:  Now, thinking about how things have changed over the last 5 years. Please tell me whether 
you think each of the following have got better, stayed the same, or got worse? (where 1 = Got better;  
2 = Stayed the same;  3 = Got worse). 
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Table 4 Access to public services and evaluations 
 Chhattisgarh  Madhya Pradesh  T Test P 
Possession of Ration 
card  
94  81  4.52 <0.0005 
 Possession of BPL 
card  
79  34  11.10 <0.0005 
Recipient of PDS  92  46  12.58 <0.0005 
Recipient of 
MGNREGA 
44 28 3.50 <0.0005 
Satisfaction with 
PDS 
1.54 3.03 12.48 <0.0005 
Notes: Final row, figures show responses to question: “All in all, how satisfied or dissatisfied would 
you say you are with the way in which the PDS runs nowadays?” (1= Very satisfied; 2= Quite satisfied; 
3= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 4= Quite dissatisfied; 5= Very dissatisfied). 
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Table 5:  Responsiveness to inducements, logistic regression 
 Model 1: 
Vegetables 
Model 2: 
Medical 
Model 3: 
Water pump 
Model 4: 
Job 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Institutional context 1.232*** 0.410 -0.009 0.269 0.041 0.239 -0.090 0.211 
Poverty (below = Ref)         
  Above poverty line -0.955* 0.496 -0.506 0.310 -0.372 0.268 -0.102 0.224 
  DK 0.064 0.485 0.127 0.330 0.404 0.297 -0.093 0.298 
Education -0.900* 0.477 -0.672** 0.301 -0.435* 0.257 -0.504** 0.220 
Caste (upper = Ref)         
OBC 1.052 0.811 0.630 0.502 0.659 0.407 0.701** 0.289 
SC 1.058 0.911 0.825 0.578 0.626 0.494 0.497 0.376 
ST 1.612** 0.806 1.147** 0.499 1.266*** 0.411 1.120*** 0.316 
Other 1.394 1.067 1.112* 0.627 0.812 0.548 -0.118 0.428 
Co-partisanship 0.690* 0.368 0.678*** 0.258 0.458** 0.232 0.406* 0.212 
Constant -1.231*** 0.410 -2.174*** 0.691 -1.864*** 0.232 -0.013 0.485 
LR Chi2 (9) 33.10***  35.07***  39.01  41.93***  
Notes: N=479. * denotes p<0.10; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 6:  Responsiveness to inducements: Predicted probabilities 
 Chhattisgarh Madhya 
Pradesh 
Vegetables 9 26 
Medicine 29 30 
Water pump 38 40 
Job 75 74 
N 239 240 
Notes: Predicted probabilities for an ST living below the poverty line, with no education. 
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Table 7:  Average treatment effect, inverse-probability-weighted regression-adjustment 
 Coeff Robust Std.Err. 
Vegetables  -0.055** 0.022 
Medicine    0.041 0.038 
Water pump   0.045 0.041 
Job   0.017 0.057 
Notes: N=479. * denotes p<0.10; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
